In the Navy

I have made the argument in the past that we are losing naval supremacy in the Pacific, as the Chinese aggressively expand their navy into a first strike-capable force. Unfortunately, I don't write for the Wall Street Journal -- but Mark Helprin does, and he makes the same point:

China is on the cusp of being able to use conventional satellites, swarms of miniature satellites, and networked surface, undersea, and aerial cuing for real-time terminal guidance with which to direct its 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles to the five or six aircraft carriers the United States (after ceding control of the Panama Canal and reducing its carrier fleet by one-third since 1987) could dispatch to meet an invasion of Taiwan. In combination with antiship weapons launched from surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, the missile barrage is designed to keep carrier battle groups beyond effective range. Had we built more carriers, provided them with sufficient missile defense, not neglected antisubmarine warfare, and dared consider suppression of enemy satellites and protections for our own, this would not be so.

With the Western Pacific cleared of American naval and air forces sufficient to defend or deter an invasion, Taiwan—without war but because of the threat of war—will capitulate and accept China's dominion, just as Hong Kong did when the evolving correlation of forces meant that Britain had no practical say in the matter. If this occurs, as likely it will, America's alliances in the Pacific will collapse. Japan, Korea, and countries in Southeast Asia and even Australasia (when China's power projection forces mature) will strike a bargain so as to avoid pro forma vassalage, and their chief contribution to the new arrangement will be to rid themselves of American bases.

Now far along in building a blue-water navy, once it dominates its extended home waters China will move to the center of the Pacific and then east, with its primary diplomatic focus acquisition of bases in South and Central America. As at one time we had the China Station, eventually China will have the Americas Station, for this is how nations behave in the international system, independently of their declarations and beliefs as often as not. What awaits us if we do not awake is potentially devastating, and those who think the subtle, indirect pressures of domination inconsequential might inquire of the Chinese their opinion of the experience.

History shows that, without fail, a rapid build-up in naval offensive capabilities is a prelude to attack. Spain in the 16th century, France in the 18th, Germany in the 19th, Japan in the 20th... they all followed exactly the same pattern. We can match this buildup and have a fighting chance to at least slow down the Chinese navy in the Pacific, or we can continue to neglect the traditional "heavy navy" in favor of limited-capability littoral warfare vessels.

Anyone who thinks deep-water naval battles are a quaint footnote to history is sadly mistaken. We came this close to losing to the Japs -- in fact, without the efforts of a few intrepid codebreakers and some astounding luck at Midway, we might have ended up ceding most of the Pacific to the Japanese Empire. At the very least, the war would've lasted years longer and drawn funds and troops away from the European theater.

Carriers and cruisers and submarines are hideously expensive vessels. But they're nowhere near as expensive as their absence.

__

(If you don't subscribe to the WSJ and want to read the whole article, just enter "Farewell to America's China Station" into a Google search and you can come in the back door.)